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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

MACH AND THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICA nON
THOMAS MANIG
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588

Scholars of the history of the philosophy of science take it pretty much
for iSranted that the scientist Ernst Mach had created much of the initial
thrust if not many of the central principles of logical positivism. And for the
most part they are quite right in thinking so. Although, as Toulmin aptly put
it, 'Mach himself was never a "logical" positivist,' Mach's radically empiricistic and anti-metaphysical orientation was sufficient to justify the feelings of
indebtedness most early logical positivists had for him. Indeed, the first
manifesto of the so-called "Vienna Circle" oflogical positivists was published
by the Viennese Ernst Mach Society, a group headed by Moritz Schlick, the
acknowledged founder of logical positivism. This manifesto announced that
the Vienna Circle, in seeking 'to eliminate metaphysical problems and
assertions as meaningless as well as to clarify the meanings of concepts and
sentences of empirical science by showing their immediately observable
content ... continues the endeavors initiated by Ernst Mach.'
Some of the central principles of logical positivism, such as the doctrine
of the unity of science, are easy to extract from Mach's written works. But
Mach was a little more cautious about stating anything quite as bold as the
principle with which we will now be primarily concerned, namely, the
Principle of Verification. In its fullest generality, the Principle of Verification
is the principle that a statement or proposition is meaningful if, and only if, it
is either analytically true or empirically verifiable. (The analytically true ones,
thought of as true come what may, are thus verified by any evidence
whatsoever.) While Mach is certainly responsible for less extreme statements
about the merits of empirical verification, he primarily regarded himself as a
scientist trying to cleanse science of metaphysical muddles, and not as a
philosopher trying to demarcate the whole realm of meaningful statements or
propositions. It is one thing to say that metaphysical statements are
physically meaningless, and quite another thing to say that they are
meaningless simpliciter. As the rising philosopher Corbin Fowler has pointed
out, 'Physical propositions are meaningless from a metaphysical point of
view.'
Throughout Mach's works, one gets the impression that Mach had
intended only to keep metaphysical considerations out of science. Apparently
he didn't care very much whether or not metaphysical considerations had a
meaningful place outside of science. Rather, he had declared 'I do not share
the Kantian point of view, in fact, occupy flO metaphysical point of view, not
even that of Berkeley.' If we respect this declaration, we must regard Mach's
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hostile attitude toward metaphysics as a scientist's attitude, and not as a
philosopher's doctrine about what is wrong with metaphysics pcr sc. Mach
never attacked metaphysics on the presumption that whatever is unempirical
or unscientific must be meaningless in all contexts, but only on the
presumption that metaphysical considerations are alien to the central
character of empirical science. The tenet that dominates Mach's discussions of
this character is that 'Economy of communication and of apprehension is of
the very essence of science.' Thus, scientific laws are merely highly
economical means of describing and communicating our sensory experiences.
(Since sensory experiences can be sorted out in any of various ways, Mach
argued that the compartmentalization of sciences into various special sciences
is arbitrary. Hence his doctrine of the unity of science.)
Metaphysical considerations get ruled out of science because they are
contrary to science's fundamentally economical character with respect to OUr
sensory experiences. For metaphysical items correspond to no features of
sensory experiences that we would ever need to communicate; mentioning
such items would just detract from the efficient reporting of experiences. The
trouble with the Newtonian conception of absolute time, for example, is that
it 'can be measured by comparison with no motion; it has therefore neither a
practical nor a scientific value; and no one is justified in saying that he knows
aught about it. It is an idle metaphysical conception.' (Fasten on the word
'idle'. )
Mach characterized empirical science with a particular epistemology in
mind, and it is noteworthy that his hostility toward metaphysics did not
extend to epistemology. His epistemology is partly expressed in the following
passage:
All our principles of mechanics are, as we have shown in detail, experimental
knowledge concerning the relative positions and motions of bodies. Even in the
provinces in which they are now recognized as valid, they could not (be), and were
not, admitted without previously being subjected to experimental tests. No one is
warranted in extending these principles beyond the boundaries of experience. In
fact, such an extension is meaningless, as no one possesses the requisite knowledge
to make use of it.

In this passage one detects a radical restriction of mechanics to empirical
principles. It was one of Mach's main tenets that laws of n~tural science are
empirical, and he frequently went out of his way to undermine apriorism in
mechanics, especially as it was manifested in the classical physical concep·
tions of mass, inertia, absolute space, absolute time and causality.
Again, what goes wrong with principles which invoke such a priori
conceptions, and what made Mach say that such principles are meaningless, is
that insofar as they are extended beyond the boundaries of experience they
lose their usefulness. For instance, any law of inertia which purports to
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describe the motion of a body which is unaffected by external forces,
purports to describe a situation we could never experience and is to that
extent useless. And casual laws which purport to describe anything other than
functional connections between sensory experiences likewise purport to
describe something we could never experience, and are likewise rendered
useless in that respect.
We've been concentrating on Mach's two tenets that the laws of natural
science are empirical and that metaphysical considerations are alien to the
central character of science because these tenets have frequently, and
appropriately, been held in conjunction with the Principle of Verification, yet
they must not be regarded as sufficient to commit one to the Principle of
Verification. In short, the fact that Mach held these two tenets does not by
itself imply his commitment to the Principle of Verification. It is true that
both of the tenets are anti-metaphysical in their source and aim, but their
force is simply to rule that metaphysical considerations are not scientific
considerations. The Principle of Verification, on the other hand, is the
stronger claim that metaphysical propositions or statements don't make any
sense at all, even in non-scientific contexts. Implicit in the desire to
implement the Principle of Verification is the idea that science constitutes the
paradigm case of meaningful discourse.
Of course Mach has powerful tendencies in that direction, too, but these
tendencies couldn't really be interpreted as central tenets of Mach's. For
example, in the Science of Mechanics, Mach did conjecture that physical
science would eventually develop into a complete world view, but this was
certainly much more conjecture than conviction; even if it were one of
Mach's tenets, it would have been relatively minor. It is likely that Mach
would have liked to believe that science constitutes the paradigm case of
meaningful discourse, but it is equally likely that he realized that he had
insufficient grounds for such a belief.
Wittgenstein and the early logical positivists incorporated various facets
of Mach's thought into their own, but not without considerable revision and
refinement. In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein incorporated Mach's empirical
atomism - the idea that all empirical knowledge is founded upon elementary
sensory units. Following Wittgenstein in their emphasis upon language, but
going beyond Wittgenstein in their exploration of idealized formal languages,
the Vienna Circle positivists sought to make Mach's positivism logical. Carnap
varied a Machian theme by requiring that logical constructions be substituted
for inferred entities wherever possible, for Mach had required the replacement
of such inferred entities as casual connections by such abstract instruments as
mathematical functions. Indeed, Mach's views concerning inferred entities
nay be neatly characterized as an instrumentalism which implies nothing
lbout the entities' reality. For Mach, an inferred entity could only be

133

HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

properly introduced into a scientific theory as an instrument for economizing
description and communication; and, although Mach excluded metaphysical
posits from science on those grounds, he did not insist that they are also to be
excluded from extrascientific contexts on those grounds.
Mach did endorse antimetaphysical views of less scope than the
full-fledged principle of verification; and to this extent he was a pioneer of
verificationist positivism. But the most fair assessment of his stated views is
that he never arrived in the Promised Land. He never sought to create a
scientific world-view which encompassed all and only empirically meaningful
discourse. Again and again, he would attack the use of a metaphYSical
principle or concept on the grounds that it was scientifically meaningless, but
never on the grounds that it was meaningless in all contexts. It is easy to
confuse this viewpoint of Mach's with his other claim that the principles of
science are indeed, wholly meaningless when removed from their empirical
life blood. Thus, Mach had been saying that metaphysical principles are
merely scientifically out of place, whereas scientific principles alienated from
experience are unconditionally out of place. We might well conclude that
Mach, dedicated scientist that he was, didn't care one way or another about
metaphysics' extrascientific status. What primarily justified his heavy influence on the logical positivists was his conjecture that physical science would
eventually develop into a comprehensive world-view.
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